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Atomism and holism in the understanding of society and 
social systems 
Throughout its history, reflection on human society has been 
torn apart by the opposing views of atomism and holism. Tra-
ditional societies, the city state of ancient Greece as well as the 
medieval perfect society apparently resemble a whole with its 
parts. Early modernity continued this holistic inclination for a 
while, but soon reverted to atomistic theories of the (hypo-
thetical) social contract. Modern humanism dominated the sub-
sequent views articulated in terms of the dialectical tension 
between nature and freedom (science ideal and personality 
ideal) – including mechanistic and vitalistic approaches as well 
as the more recent acknowledgment of irreducibly complex 
systems (Behe, 2003). In Wiener’s (1954; 1956) “technologi-
cism” human responsibility and freedom are sacrificed. An alter-
native view is advanced in terms of the normativity of societal 
life as well as its many-sidedness. It is shown that theories of 
social systems increasingly tend to explore avenues trans-
cending the limitations of the atomistic additive approach and 
the boundary-leveling whole-parts scheme entailed in social 
systems theory. This development is used as a starting point for 
the classification of social interaction and for underscoring the 
scope of the principle of sphere-sovereignty for a multidisci-
plinary understanding of social systems. 
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Opsomming 
Atomisme en holisme in die verstaan van die samelewing en 
sosiale stelsels 
Dwarsdeur die geskiedenis tref ons teenstellende opvattings 
oor die menslike samelewing aan, naamlik atomistiese en holis-
tiese sienings. Tradisionele samelewings, die stadstaat van an-
tieke Griekeland asook die middeleeuse perfekte samelewing, 
vertoon skynbare ooreenkomste met ’n geheel en die dele 
daarvan. Die vroeg-moderne tyd het hierdie holistiese geneigd-
heid voortgesit, maar het spoedig oorgeslaan na atomistiese 
teorieë van ’n hipotetiese sosiale verdrag. In die daaropvolgen-
de tydperk was die opvattings van die Humanisme dominant. 
Dit het gestalte aangeneem in die spanning wat na vore gekom 
het tussen natuur en vryheid (natuurwetenskapsideaal en 
persoonlikheidsideaal). Die Humanistiese erfenis het ’n tuiste 
gebied vir meganistiese- sowel as vitalistiese benaderings as-
ook vir die meer resente erkenning van onherleibaar-komplekse 
stelsels (Behe, 2003). Wiener (1954; 1956) se “tegnologisisme” 
het die mens se verantwoordelikheid en vryheid opgeoffer. In ’n 
alternatiewe siening word aandag gegee aan die normatiwiteit 
van die menslike samelewing terwyl daar ook gelet word op die 
veelsydigheid daarvan. Daar word aangetoon dat sosiale sis-
teemteorieë toenemend daartoe neig om weë te ondersoek 
waarlangs ’n mens die beperkings van die atomistiese optel-
sombenadering asook die grensuitwissende geheel-deleskema 
van die holisme te bowe kom. Hierdie ontwikkeling word ge-
bruik as aanknopingspunt vir die klassifikasie van vorms van 
sosiale interaksie asook vir ’n beklemtoning van die reikwydte 
van die beginsel van soewereiniteit-in-eie-kring vir ’n multi-
dissiplinêre verstaan van sosiale stelsels. 
1. Orientation 
Humankind is known to have lived in societies since the dawn of 
history. It is therefore not surprising that the emergence of theo-
retical reflection on the human predicament was accompanied by 
attempts to portray the best way of living together and the best way 
to understand what is entailed in the good (societal) life. 
The history of theoretical reflection upon the nature of human so-
ciety diverges into two mutually exclusive (and often opposing) 
modes of explanation, an atomistic and a holistic one. Although both 
these approaches were already present in ancient Greece – where 
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the atomism (individualism)1 of Callicles was opposed by the even-
tual holism (universalism) of Plato (advanced in his Politeia – Books 
4 to 8, 1966) and Aristotle (in his Politics, 1894: 1, 149-150; 1253 a 
19 ff.) – traditional societies appear to be close to a holistic per-
spective. The extended family (German: Großfamilie), sib and clan 
as well as the politically stronger organised tribe, are all examples of 
close-knit social practices where it is the whole that acts in various 
capacities, be it as a farming (agricultural), political or cultic unit. 
In ancient Greece the undifferentiated patrician clans were the 
bearers of power within the Greek city states (the polis). The latter 
took on diverse forms but within them the popular assembly of free 
citizens assumed a position of power. In the course of its further 
development the polis ended the dominance of the clans, tribes and 
brotherhoods in replacing the initial four Ionian tribes with ten new 
territorial tribes. This provided the basis for the well-known Athenian 
democracy that reached its peak under Pericles (446-404 BC). Soon 
after the end of the Persian wars the reign of Pericles came to a fall. 
During the golden fifth century BC the transition from the older 
undifferentiated clans and tribes to the relatively more differentiated 
legal order of the polis was witnessed.  
While the prepolis period was still strongly influenced by conceptions 
of dikè and themis (the internal legal order of the clans) as the 
guardian of the natural order of things, the fifth century witnessed 
significant new developments. Dikè now designated the positive law 
formed by the polis and the punishment exercised by virtue of these 
positive laws. On the basis of his conception of a threefold soul, 
Plato then developed a theory of justice in the form of his utopian 
view of the state, constituted by the (lowest) artisan class, the (inter-
mediate) warrior class and the (ruling) class of philosopher kings (50 
years and older). The qualification utopian must be coupled with 
another characteristic feature, namely its all-encompassing, totali-
tarian focus. Furthermore, justice is seen as a moral virtue assigning 
to the virtues of temperance, courage and wisdom each their place. 
The ideal state is destined to achieve moral goodness – a view 
continued by Aristotle in his teleological understanding according to 
which society develops from the family (as germ cell) via the village 
to the state, having as its goal moral perfection. 
                                      
1 Atomism and holism attempt to explain the universe in terms of a discrete 
multiplicity of basic entities (atoms). Holism, by contract, proceeds from some or 
other whole, encompassing whatever else there is as mere parts. 
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During the Medieval era this view was subordinated to the supra 
natural realm of grace – moral perfection is the natural portal of the 
supranatural position of the church as perfect institute of grace, 
having eternal bliss as its final goal. The initial ideal of a perfect 
society was thus incorporated in the Roman Catholic view of the 
Corpus Christianum as the societas perfecta. When the power of the 
Roman Catholic church reached its peak under Pope Boniface VIII 
at the beginning of the fourteenth century, it served as a relatively 
differentiated superstructure over-arching a relatively undifferen-
tiated substructure. Both the guild system and the feudal order pre-
ceded the subsequent differentiation of Western society. 
At the time of the Renaissance, early modernity was acquainted with 
the inclination to contemplate an ideal society. When Thomas Moore 
published his Utopia in 1516 he simply continued this long-standing 
inclination. Moore, on the one hand, criticises existing society and 
alternatively portrays a perfect life without private ownership, cen-
tered in a market-place. The peculiarly new feature of the modern 
era specifically surfaces in Bacon’s New Atlantis for in it we find a 
starting-point of the modern ideal that believes that a science 
directed towards the pure facts will be able to liberate humankind 
from its burdens. This eventually turned into an essential part of the 
enlightenment progress ideal. 
However, this science ideal soon turned utopian thinking upside 
down. Instead of contemplating an ideal not found in the empirical 
world, it sets out to break down reality theoretically (i.e. by means of 
a thought experiment) in order to reconstruct a new world according 
to the plan of human reason. Hobbes (1968) explicitly explored the 
possibilities of such a thought experiment. In his work on material 
things he first demolished the ordered world into a heap of chaos 
and then, by using well-defined concepts, reconstructed it from ratio-
nal resources. Applied to human society this resulted in the early 
modern theories of the social contract (Hobbes, Pufendorff, Thoma-
sius and Locke). The natural science ideal proceeded in an atomistic 
fashion, and extending its claims to the realm of human society 
entailed that the atoms of society, namely the individuals, should 
now be used as building blocks in the rational construction of so-
ciety. This is a hypothetical account of the emergence of an ordered 
society. Initially this atomistic approach served theories of the 
power-state (which is both absolutistic and totalitarian – such as 
defended by Hobbes who claims that the social contract empowered 
the monarch to everything – see Hobbes, 1968:230), the state as 
Leviathan not acknowledging any limits to its power. 
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However, the initial driving force behind the natural science ideal is 
found in the Renaissance motive of autonomous freedom. It was 
only in order to proclaim this freedom that an instrument was 
required and the ideal of an all-encompassing natural scientific 
analysis (in mathematical-mechanical-physical terms) provided such 
an instrument, considered to support the enthronement of the per-
sonality ideal.2 Unfortunately this instrument turned out to contain 
the largest threat to its creator, because the mere idea that every-
thing in the universe is subject to exact natural laws ultimately 
eliminates all human freedom. Those who were in the grip of the 
science ideal and thought of the future of society, became victims of 
a totalitarian view according to which everything could be mastered 
and controlled, envisaging also human society according to a fixed 
and predetermined pattern.3 
During the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries we find new 
dominant principles of explanation entering the scene, although their 
core meaning already surfaced in Greek philosophy. This is par-
ticularly the case regarding the opposition of constancy and change 
– an opposition underlying the claim of Heraclitus that one can never 
step into the same river twice. The physicalist atomism (also known 
as materialism) of some enligthenment thinkers was challenged by 
the focus on the organic during the Romantic period (late eighteenth 
and early nineteenth centuries). It was during this period that the 
rationalistic atomism of the Enlightenment made room for the 
ideology of the community, proceeding from an irrationalistic4 and 
holistic perspective. The rationalistic ethics of Kant sacrificed indivi-
duality to the universally valid law-giving entailed in the categorical 
                                      
2 When Edmund Husserl portrays the development of modern philosophy he 
characterises its “rationalistic science-ideal” (Husserl, 1954:119). His contem-
porary, Georg Simmel, used the expression “personality ideal” (see Lotter, 
2000:188). According to Dooyeweerd one can view nature (science ideal) and 
freedom (personality ideal) as the basic motive or groundmotive of modern 
(humanistic) philosophy (Dooyeweerd, 1997-1:200 ff., 216 ff.). 
3 Both Huxley’s The Brave New World (1932) and Orwell’s 1984 (published in 
1948) continued to portray an encompassing stable community solely guided by 
a concern for the self – although Orwell ultimately sacrifices freedom to the 
power of the elite (the tyranny of a powerstate; see Van Riessen, 1952:58-67). 
4 One may define rationalism as an epistemological position overemphasising 
universality and irrationalism as overaccentuating individuality. Dooyeweerd 
identified the law for and the lawfulness of reality and therefore he mistakenly 
thought that rationalism and irrationalism respectively absolutises the law side 
and factual side of reality. 
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imperative, whereas Romanticism claimed that each individual, and 
eventually each organic community (nation) is a law unto itself. Later 
on Darwin reverted to an extreme form of physicalism in his 1859 
work (cf. Strauss, 2007). The rise of neo-Vitalism during the end of 
the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century 
once again continued to impose the difference between physicalistic 
and organicistic approaches upon views of human society – still 
accompanied by the opposition between atomism and holism. 
The incredibly complex nature of living entities more recently – once 
again a century later – inspired considerations concerning the struc-
tural plan (German: Bauplan) of living things, particularly advanced 
by Behe in his idea of irreducibly complex systems (cf. Behe, 
2003:39 ff.).5  
With his specific understanding of information as the reverse of 
entropy – the one is simply the opposite of the other (Wiener, 
1950:18) – Wiener introduced his new discipline of cybernetics. His 
understanding of information is closely connected to communication 
and since sociology and anthropology are basically sciences of 
communication they are considered to be parts of cybernetics. Yet 
he orients himself to physics and logical positivism (Wiener, 1964: 
89) as well as to pragmatism. This explains why he holds that words 
such as “life, purpose, and soul are grossly inadequate to precise 
scientific thinking” (Wiener, 1954:31). He therefore advises that it is 
best “to avoid all question-begging epithets such as ‘life’, ‘soul’, 
‘vitalism’, and the like”. There is no reason why “machines” may not 
“resemble human beings in representing pockets of decreasing 
entropy in a framework in which the large entropy tends to increase” 
(Wiener, 1954:32). 
What used to be seen as a unique feature of living entities, their 
constant exchange of materials (already in ancient Greece con-
nected to fire as the symbol of life), is merely a characteristic of 
thermodynamically open systems (just recall Von Bertalanffy’s 
(1973:149) generalisation of the second main law to open systems). 
It therefore does not contradict Wiener’s physicalistic inclination to 
highlight an open system when he says: “We are but whirlpools in a 
river of ever-flowing water. We are not stuff that abides, but patterns 
that perpetuate themselves.” (Wiener, 1954:96.) 
                                      
5 Sussenbach (2005:138) supports this idea of Behe and explains celldivision as 
an example of an irreducibly complex system. 
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Since Wiener equates the human person with cybernetic machines 
and identify information with structure (pattern) his physicalistic fan-
tasy truly envisages what, according to him, it is in principle (al-
though currently not practically executable) highly plausible: “In 
other words, the fact that we cannot telegraph the pattern of a man 
from one place to another seems to be due to technical difficulties, 
… The idea itself is highly plausible” (Wiener, 1954:104). 
His combination of communication and control, combined with his 
mentioned comparison of machines and human beings, underscores 
the ultimate physicalistic determinism present in his thought, in prin-
ciple eliminating human freedom. Schuurman is therefore justified in 
his critical stance towards Wiener. He rejects the equation of en-
tropy and information for it is only through technological formation 
that the physical energy-structure can become information (Schuur-
man, 2008:185). In this way energy becomes structured energy, 
such as in signals – and this leads him to the conclusion that “[i]nfor-
mation theory is really the theory of signal transmission” (Schuur-
man, 2008:392). According to him  
[p]hysical energy is the basis for information conceived as the 
analytical substratum of language. The transporting of informa-
tion – communication – is a total event in which the lingual ob-
ject function retrocipates, via the analytical function, on the 
energy function (Schuurman, 2008:186).  
With his ultimate concern for “mechanical control” Wiener’s “philo-
sophy is a form of technologism” (Schuurman, 2008:205). Human 
responsibility and freedom are not accounted for. 
2. The matrix of normativity in human society 
When the accountable human freedom to respond to normative 
principles is acknowledged, human society can be appreciated in 
terms of modes of explanation exceeding the one-sidedness en-
tailed in atomistic, holistic, mechanistic, physicalistic or vitalistic 
approaches.6 A mere focus upon aspects of nature, such as those 
of number (the point of orientation of atomism), space (the starting-
point of holism), the kinematic (explored by mechanistic views) the 
physical (distorted by physicalism) cannot furnish us with an insight 
                                      
6 Note that these five isms find their point of orientation in the following five 
aspects of reality – respectively the arithmetical, spatial, kinematic, physical and 
biotic aspects. 
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into the normative accountability of human beings. This unique hu-
man freedom first of all manifests itself in the normative contraries 
present in our everyday experience of life, such as those between 
logical and illogical, kind and hostile, legal and illegal, thrifty and 
wasteful, beautiful and ugly, polite and impolite. 
Without a yardstick, a norm or a principle, it will not be possible to 
differentiate between what is logical, i.e. conforming to logical prin-
ciples such as those of identity, non-contradiction, the excluded mid-
dle, sufficient reason, thought economy, and so on. Although there 
may be differences of opinion regarding the nature of these prin-
ciples it cannot be denied that principles are involved. 
The first task of this kind of approach will be to identify the different 
kinds of normative principles guiding human societal activities. For 
example, if one considers societal collectivities such as universities, 
cultural associations, sport clubs, states, or marriages, it is always 
possible to find a guiding or leading normative perspective. Universi-
ties, for example, as academic institutions, are guided by theoretical-
logical concerns captured in the idea of scholarship (teaching and 
doing research). Likewise, states, as public legal institutions, are 
guided by concerns for public justice, business enterprises by con-
siderations of frugality, i.e. avoiding what is excessive. A tentative 
list of all the normative aspects of reality is given by the following: 
the logical-analytical aspect, the cultural-historical aspect, the sign 
mode, the social facet, the economic function, the aesthetic mode, 
the jural side, as well as the moral and certitudinal spheres. 
It is clear that human beings do function within all these normative 
aspects, because they are capable of thinking and arguing; of cul-
tural forming and shaping; of speaking, listening and interpreting; of 
socialising; of acting in frugal, non-excessive ways; of appreciating 
what is beautiful; in observing the rights of others; in respecting and 
loving fellow human beings; and in trusting, believing and confiding. 
Whereas animals experience reality exclusively from their natural 
inclination,7 directed at that which is important to them in a physical, 
biotic and sensitive sense,8 human beings have the flexible freedom 
                                      
7 Portmann (1990:79) characterises animals as Umweltgebunden (constrained by 
environment) and Instinktgesichert (protected by instinct). 
8 Animals experience reality in terms of that which is negotiable and not 
negotiable, edible and inedible, in terms of same sex and opposite sex, 
comforting and alarming. 
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to choose alternative guiding functions for their actions. Since those 
aspects in which a person typically functions are not instinctively 
assured or bound, humankind has a flexibility making possible an 
incredible specialisation in differentiated civilisations. Even Simpson 
(1969:90) emphasises this: “Such specialization, which is non-gene-
tic, requires individual flexibility and could not occur in a mainly in-
stinctive animal.” 
Portmann (1974:102) typifies the peculiar human freedom of choice 
as follows:  
The narrow limitations of animal interests is opposed to our 
freedom of choice and direction. Animals can escape the bonds 
of their urges only to a limited extent, while I myself can, in 
every moment, in accordance with my whole attentativeness, 
turn my entire inwardly participative dedication to some or other 
matter, however insignificant it may appear to be. 
However, human beings functioning within various aspects and 
under the guidance of particular normative vistas are not isolated 
individuals, they are organised in diverse social collectivities and 
these social entities display a unique intertwinement owing to the 
fact that every human being can assume multiple social roles within 
themselves, without ever being exhausted by any one of them. Over 
and above these collective roles, human beings also live out a 
personal domain of freedom not absorbed by any societal institution. 
It was particularly the discipline of sociology that accepted the 
challenge to account for the complexities of human social inter-
action. An analysis of the history of this discipline reveals a variation 
of positions in this respect, with the earlier mentioned atomistic and 
holistic views as extreme opposites. 
3. Basic concepts: an interdisciplinary many-sidedness 
Unfortunately sociological theorising attempted to come to terms 
with the complexity of human social interaction without explicitly and 
critically entering into an analysis of the basic concepts involved in 
its theoretical analyses. The basic concepts I have in mind can be 
phrased in combined phrases where the qualifying term in each 
instance designates the perspective of the discipline under 
consideration – the social. No single sociological theory managed to 
side-step the implicit or explicit use of the following elementary basic 
concepts: social order, social stratification, social constancy and dy-
namics, social differentiation and integration, social sensitivity, soli-
Atomism and holism in the understanding of society and social systems 
196   Koers 73(2) 2008:187-205 
darity and consciousness, social consensus and conflict, social po-
wer and control, and social symbolism, meaning and interpretation.9 
These elementary basic concepts must be distinguished from true 
metaphors. Their (implicit or explicit) use proved to serve as the 
foundation for the widely diverging theoretical designs operative du-
ring the past two centuries of sociological theorising. An explicit and 
articulated account of these elementary basic concepts may enable 
us to develop an integral perspective on sociology as a discipline. In 
addition such an analysis will demonstrate that the discipline of so-
ciology evinces an encyclopaedic coherence with all the other aca-
demic disciplines, because in each case the second term, qualified 
by the term social, reflects the meaning of a different aspect of 
reality serving as point of entry for a distinct special science.  
It happens frequently that a particular sociological approach over-
emphasises a specific basic concept of sociology. Sometimes even 
a combination of certain elementary basic concepts is overestima-
ted. These privileged basic concepts then serve as the encompass-
ing or root perspective of the theoretical design under consideration. 
In such a case one or a limited number of basic concepts are 
removed from their coherence with all the other basic concepts and 
elevated to the comprehensive level of an all-determining totality or 
root perspective. In this process many pseudoroots are created. 
Each such pseudoroot subtly provides an encompassing anchoring 
for all the other basic concepts covered by its umbrella. Though 
research shows, for example, that certain concepts are used more 
frequently by symbolic interactionism than by the structural func-
tional approach, it does not mean that either of these theoretical 
trends could sidestep the inevitability of using all the elementary 
basic concepts of sociology. The only difference is that each orien-
tation attaches its own understanding to those elements that do not 
occupy a central position. 
Of course these approaches did see some worthwhile traits in reality 
but unfortunately distorted the meaning of what they discovered 
through a one-sided overemphasis. Even the most extreme reduc-
tionistic approach, after all, did see something “out there” in reality – 
something all sociological approaches have to account for in their 
own way. 
                                      
9 The meaning and coherence of these elementary basic concepts are analysed 
in detail in Strauss (2006:125-244). 
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As we all know the modern scholarly dispensation is characterised 
by a large number of distinct academic disciplines – basically dif-
ferentiated in the natural sciences and the humanities. Within the 
natural sciences perhaps the two most familiar, but also most per-
plexing realities are found in the nature of matter and the complex 
nature of living entities (“life” – compare the above-mentioned view 
of Behe (2003) regarding irreducibly complex systems) – and Wie-
ner (1954:9 ff.; 21 ff.) added information as something irreducible to 
matter (and its equivalent: energy). Within the humanities the reality 
of complex social (global) systems appear to pose a challenge to a 
multidisciplinary understanding in which the diverse academic 
disciplines (special sciences) play their role. A truly complex system 
cannot be decomposed or reduced to the angle of approach of any 
distinct special science focusing on it. The modern state or the 
business enterprise, for example, exceeds the scope of both the 
disciplines of law and economics, for the simple reason that neither 
a state nor a firm can be completely reduced to either of these 
perspectives (aspects) – the economic or the jural.10 
Even the most basic concept of physical nature, that of matter, ex-
ceeds the grasp of merely one angle of approach; and that in spite 
of the aim of superstring theory to produce a “theory of everything” it 
turned out that not even matter could be explained exclusively in 
physical terms. It is therefore not surprising that Stegmüller (1987) 
believes that one of the most difficult questions facing science in the 
twentieth century is indeed given in the concept of matter, which he 
considers to be mysterious in the utmost sense.  
When Stegmüller continues his explanation of the problems at-
tached to an understanding of the nature of matter the most basic 
aspects of empirical reality surface. In the first place he distinguish-
es two global basic conceptions regarding the nature of matter and 
he points out that currently these conceptions once again, as pre-
viously, occupy a prominent place in the discussions. He calls these 
two basic conceptions the atomistic conception and the continuity 
conception.11 Also Laugwitz (1986) points out that insofar as phy-
                                      
10 Note that what we have in mind here is the ontic nature of these aspects. Once 
the jural takes on positive forms within statelaw, for example, the term juridical 
is applicable. 
11 “Selbst die beiden großen Grundkonzepte über die Natur der Materie stehen 
heute nach wie vor zur Diskussion, wenn auch mannigfaltig verschleiert hinter 
Bergen von Formeln. Diese beiden Grundkonzepte kann man als die 
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sics subjects itself to auxiliary means from mathematics, it cannot 
escape from the polarity between continuity and discreteness.12 
As we noted the opposing extremes of atomistic and holistic ap-
proaches in the understanding of nature (physics and biology) are 
also present within the humanities. One merely has to reflect upon 
the connection and difference between the biotic aspect and the 
social aspect of reality. Without any doubt there are marked 
similarities between biotic phenomena and the structure and func-
tioning of human society. Certain sociological trends of thought were 
so impressed by these similarities that they viewed social pheno-
mena as living organisms – thus neglecting the differences between 
social phenomena and biotic phenomena. Of course this theoretical 
approach could manifest itself in multiple ways. It includes the social 
theories of Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, Hegel, Comte, Spencer, 
Spann, Wiener, Parsons, Von Bertalanffy, Buckley, Alexander and 
Münch – to recall a few. Most of these thinkers share the theoretical 
conviction that society ought to be analysed in terms of a(n organic) 
whole and its (organic) parts. This is what we designated as a 
holistic or universalistic approach. 
Of course an overemphasis of the biotical analogy within the 
structure of the social aspect of reality by its very nature contradicts 
those theoretical approaches which overemphasise other analogical 
structural moments within the social aspect. Therefore it is insuf-
ficient simply to relativise the presence of diverse “schools of socio-
logical thought” since they are genuinely, due to diverging reduc-
tionistic perspectives, mutually exclusive. Such a relativising attempt 
was undertaken by Fletcher (1971a:815 ff.). Waters (1994:345) cor-
rectly remarks: “The pleasures of complementarity notwithstanding, 
theories which contradict one another cannot all be correct or true.” 
A consistent organicistic holism finds its theoretical opposition in an 
atomistic individualism according to which all societal entities are 
mere collections of individuals. Alexander (1987:12) casts this oppo-
sition in the following terms: rational-individualistic versus rational-
collectivist. Another way to formulate this dilemma concerns the 
problems related to action on the one hand and order on the other 
                                                                                                              
atomistische Auffassung und als die Kontinuumsauffassung der Materie 
bezeichnen.” (Stegmüller, 1987:91.) 
12 “Die Physik, insofern sie sich mathematischer Hilfsmittel bedient oder sich gar 
der Mathematik unterwirft, kann an der Polarität von Kontinuierlichem und 
Diskretem nicht vorbei.” (Laugwitz, 1986:9.) 
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hand (Alexander, 1987:12). Alexander also speaks of “subjective 
voluntarism” and “objective constraint” (Alexander, 1987:376). He 
believes that these problems are not optional: “every theory takes 
some position on both” (Alexander, 1987:12). Yet, according to him 
no intellectual tradition can be grounded in conceptions of action 
alone. We are concerned here with social theories, and every social 
theory must also be concerned about the problem of order (Alexan-
der, 1988:13-14). 
A consistent individualistic or atomistic method of concept formation 
and research, aims at reducing all societal relationships, processes 
and collectivities to “individuals-in-interaction”. It is opposed to a 
universalistic or holistic approach. The latter always proceeds from 
one or other social whole – sometimes plainly designated as “so-
ciety” or the “social system” and, consequently, assigns a subordi-
nate role to the individual – as being a mere part of this encom-
passing whole. In various chapters of Hollinger’s (1994) work on 
Postmodernism and the social sciences we find an extensive dis-
cussion of two “different models” with their accompanying methods 
of analysis: the “atomistic model” and the “organic model”. 
Hollinger points out that the atomistic model, which is derived from 
Newtonian physics and defended by advocates of the enlighten-
ment, especially by liberals and utilitarians, views society as an ag-
gregation of individuals governed by the laws of nature, particularly 
the law of the maximisation of one’s rational self-interest. The 
organic model, derived from Plato and Aristotle, is defended by ro-
mantics and other counter-enlightenment figures, including many 
political and cultural conservatives and reactionaries, and also by 
Marx. In this view, individuals are products of their community and 
can only realise themselves in it (Hollinger, 1994:5). 
4. A classification of social interaction 
Though one may argue that both these approaches highlight rele-
vant facets of social reality, the one-sided claims they make – to the 
exclusion of each other – cannot both be maintained at the same 
time. The first step in overcoming the one-sidedness present in 
these two opposing approaches is to combine the elementary basic 
concepts of sociology in a complex analysis of the different ways of 
social interaction within a differentiated society. This is made pos-
sible by the fact that the social aspect of reality can only reveal its 
meaning through its coherence with all the other aspects, including 
those preceding the social aspect in the order of aspects. All con-
crete events in principle function within all aspects of reality, there-
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fore this concrete many-sidedness invites all the academic disci-
plines to make their distinct contribution to an understanding of 
social action. If we restrict ourselves first of all to the possible ways 
in which an account can be given of social interaction, it soon 
becomes clear that such social interaction cannot be described and 
classified without “borrowing” terms from non-social aspects. This is 
already evinced in the expression interaction. The word inter means 
between and is derived from the meaning of spatial extension and 
positionality, while the word action comes from the meaning of 
physical activity. Particularly the physical analogy of thermodynamic 
open systems enables the conceptual understanding of social phe-
nomena of mutual exchange. The coming and going of individuals 
do not eliminate the durability (identity) of that specific social rela-
tion. Of course incidental social events cannot constitute a durable 
whole which continues regardless of the exchange of participating 
social subjects. 
Social interaction can occur within a social form of life that is inte-
grated into a genuine whole or totality. Alternatively it can occur on a 
less rigid basis of standing over against one another or facing one 
another. The standing alongside or in coordination with fellow 
human beings differ in nature from those forms of social interaction 
where definitive relations of sub- or superordination are found. This 
distinction between social next to each other (coordination) and so-
cial super- and subordination reveals the intrinsic coherence be-
tween the social and the spatial aspects – they represent analogies 
of the meaning of space within the meaning of the social aspect. 
However, in order to understand super- and subordination more ful-
ly, the analogy of formative power (control) is needed – i.e. an ana-
logy from the cultural-historical aspect. Legitimate power in the case 
of human relationships is bound to an office, entailing certain com-
petencies and involving an office-bearer exercising authority over 
fellow human beings. This is not the only context where the term 
competence is used – interindividual relations which are on an equal 
footing presumes a certain social maturity or competence, even if it 
applies to something like little children playing. This competence for 
social exchanges constantly requires the ability to correctly interpret 
the response of other social subjects (analogy of the sign aspect), 
because without it the mutuality of interaction would become dis-
pirited. 
From these examples it is clear that a classification of the different 
underlying ways of interaction will have to keep in mind the meaning 
which a particular expression of all analogical structural moments in 
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the social aspect acquires. A complete analysis of this would take us 
into an analysis of the complex (or: composite) basic concepts of 
sociology as scientific discipline, therefore we just briefly mention 
the result of such an analysis. 
The following two characteristics are important: 
• a durable unitary character; and 
• a permanent structure of super- and subordination (i.e., of autho-
rity). 
When a social form of life (lifeform) possesses both a durable uni-
tary character and a permanent authority structure, it may be 
designated as a social collectivity (in German: Verband). Examples 
of societal collectivities are the state, the church, business, the 
school, the university, the (nuclear) family, the art club, the sports 
club, the cultural club and the language club. The state displays both 
a durable relation of sub- and superordination (authority of office-
bearers and those subject to it, i.e. a permanent authority structure), 
while the unity and identity of a state is not abolished through the 
coming and going of its citizens (be it office-bearers or subjects). 
The same applies for all the other societal collectivities that we 
named in the list of examples. 
When a social form of life only displays one of these characteristics, 
we call it a community. A nation (volk) in the cultural (ethnic) sense 
of the term and the extended family both possess a durable unitary 
character (that is why there is continuity between a nation of a 
hundred years ago and today in spite of changes), but no permanent 
authority structure can be indicated. In terms of these distinctions 
neither a state, nor a province, nor a rural town is a community. With 
reference to the state-side of the given facts, we are working with 
(higher or lower) forms of governmental authority – and therefore 
with relations of sub- and superordination which are absent from the 
communities mentioned in the sense defined above. A city and a 
town exhibit an interlacement of differently natured societal collec-
tivities, communities and coordinational relationships.13 
At this point social system theory in all its variants unfortunately fails 
to appreciate the distinct uniqueness of the multiplicity of social 
                                      
13 Coordinational relationships have neither a permanent authority structure, nor a 
solidary unitary character – they concern the interrelations of individuals and 
organisations on an equal footing with each other. 
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collectivities, communities and coordinational relationships for it ad-
heres to an application of the whole parts relation (systems-sub-
systems relation) that is originally found in the spatial aspect and 
then erroneously extended to serve as a basic denominator in terms 
of which society on the whole could be understood. There are as 
many options within this holistic (universalistic) legacy as there are 
distinct societal collectivities or communities. Just consider the three 
“holy cows” of the West: church, people (ethnic communities) and 
the state. Each of them suffered from the ideological distortion of 
being elevated to the encompassing whole of human society, with all 
the others degraded to mere subordinate parts of the assumed 
totality. 
5. Sphere-sovereignty 
However, one finds points of connection for an alternative view 
among some of the most prominent thinkers in the field. In the neo-
functionalism of Alexander and Münch the “own inner laws” of 
differentiated societal spheres of life are acknowledged. According 
to Münch the starting-point of the theoretical debate of the 1980s is 
found in “Weber’s theory of rationalization of modern society into 
spheres that are guided to an increasing extent by their own inner 
laws” (Münch, 1990:442). In particular he mentions the “political sys-
tem” with “its own inner laws” (Münch, 1990:444). This idea is known 
as that of sphere-sovereignty. Since Van Prinsterer, Kuyper and 
Dooyeweerd emphasised that no single societal institution or col-
lectivity ought to be subordinated to any other, they in principle 
actually took a stance in opposition to the whole-parts scheme (sys-
tems and subsystems). Although Rawls (1996) severely struggles 
with atomism and holism in his thought, he does evince an aware-
ness of the inner nature of distinct societal entities. “But it is the 
distinct purposes and roles of the parts of the social structure, and 
how they fit together, that explains there being different principles for 
distinct kinds of subjects.” (Rawls, 1996:262.) On the same page he 
refers to the distinctive autonomy of elements of society where 
principles within their own sphere fit their peculiar nature.  
This formulation indeed comes close to the idea of sphere-
sovereignty. Indeed, it seems natural to suppose that the dis-
tinctive character and autonomy of the various elements of 
society requires that, within some sphere, they act from their 
own principles designed to fit their peculiar nature. (Rawls, 
1996:262.) 
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In a differentiated society various forms of life are institutional in the 
sense that they bind together individuals for their entire life or just for 
a part of their lives, independent of their own decisions (such as the 
state and the nuclear family). Yet not all societal collectivities 
possess such an institutional character. A business firm, a university 
or a sport club are all examples of societal collectivities which rest 
totally on voluntary membership. Yet it is impossible for any person 
to let his/her life be taken up completely in any of the various 
societal collectivities and communities in which he/she functions – 
simply because such a person at the same time also takes part in 
various other interrelations. Two families, for example, stand in a 
(intercollective) coordinational relationship; two married couples in a 
(intercommunal) coordinational relationship. Furthermore, every indi-
vidual is, in a differentiated society, taken up in countless inter-
individual coordinational relationships where that individual relates 
informally to fellow human beings in coordinated contexts. Conver-
sely, no person’s life is ever completely absorbed in coordinational 
relationships, because at the opposite side we find institutional and 
non-institutional communities in which that person is involved. The 
variety of differentiated, partial, peripheral relationships is therefore 
nothing more than the multiplicity of social collectivities, communal 
and coordinational relationships in which human beings are socially 
involved. 
A systematic analysis of the typical totality structure of social entities 
is found in the third volume of the magnum opus of Dooyeweerd (cf. 
1997-3) where he develops the idea of the foundational and 
qualifying functions of social collectivities and communities. The 
perspectives opened-up in this analysis successfully integrates the 
challenge of multidisciplinary perspectives on social systems while 
at the same time arguing for a perspective transcending the short-
comings inherent in atomistic and holistic approaches to human so-
ciety. This view includes a distinction between modal laws and type 
laws,14 but an exploration of these distinctions exceeds the confines 
of this article. Its purpose was merely to highlight the inevitability of 
explicitly accounting for the basic concepts (elementary, complex 
and typical) of a scientific reflection on human society, against the 
background of societal practices and theoretical approaches (mainly 
                                      
14 Modal laws encompass all possible entities (such as the first two main laws of 
thermodynamics), while type laws hold for a limited class of entities only (the 
law for being an atom does not hold for everything whatsoever). 
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in the grip of the modern humanistic motive of nature and 
freedom).15 
The global world in which we live needs developments enhancing a 
further differentiation of accountable responsibilities – for fellow 
human beings and for our planet, unless it wants to derail into a path 
of dedifferentiation, torn apart by the tensions between the science-
ideal and the personality ideal, modernity and postmodernity, 
atomism and holism. 
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